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The End of Leadership? - Constraints on 
the World Role of Obama’s America1 
1 This paper is mainly extracted from Barry Buzan, ‘A Leader Without Followers? The United States 
in World Politics After Bush’, Global Policy Institute Pamphlet No. 6, Forumpress, July 2009.
Barry Buzan is Montague Burton professor of International Relations at the LSE, a Senior Fellow at 
IDEAS, Honorary professor at the Universities of Copenhagen and Jilin, and a Fellow of the British 
Academy. Among his recent books is The United States and the Great Powers: World Politics in the 
Twenty-First Century (Polity, 2004).
INTRODUCTION
It is appealing to think of the Obama administration as a return to normalcy after the deviance, unilateralist arrogance and damaging mistakes of the Bush years. In this view, we should expect a 
return to business as usual, with the US picking up the signature themes of multilateralism and the 
market that have underpinned its world role since the end of the Second World War. Although by no 
means universally loved, the US was an effective leader through the Cold War and beyond not only 
because it promoted liberal economic and political values that were attractive to many others, but also 
because it was prepared to bind its own power in multilateral rules and institutions sufficiently that 
its followers could contain their fear of its overwhelming power. Does Obama’s liberal stance mean 
that we should expect a return to the leadership role that the US has exercised for more than half a 
century? I argue that this is unlikely to happen because there are now three powerful constraints that 
will largely block a return to US leadership. The first is that the US has lost much of its followership. 
The second is that the capacity of the US to lead is now much weakened even if it still retains the will 
to do so. The third is that there is a general turn within international society against hegemony and 
therefore against the global leadership role itself.
LOST FOLLOWERSHIP
If the US remains willing to lead, will anyone follow? There are two issues here: the growing range of 
policy disagreements on specific issues between the US and others; and the decline of shared values 
and visions between the US and its former followers. A good symbol of the weakening relationship 
between the US and its followers is the replacement of talk about ‘friends and allies’ or ‘the free 
world’ with a much harsher and still basically unchanged, line about ‘coalitions of the willing’. There 
is some hope that under Obama differences over policy might improve in specific areas, particularly 
the environment, but even on that issue Obama will be lucky just to get the US seen as not part of 
the problem. Domestic constraints on carbon pricing and accepting binding international standards 
will make it difficult for the US to lead. Many other areas of disagreement remain, some deep. The 
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US has failed to make the war on terrorism into 
anything like the binding cause that underpinned 
its leadership during the Cold War, and its policies 
continue to erode its liberal credentials. By its use 
of torture, and even moreso the public advocacy 
of such interrogation techniques by senior Bush 
administration figures, and by its rejection of the 
Geneva Conventions on prisoners or war, it exposed 
itself to ridicule and contempt as an advocate for 
human rights. That China is still plausibly able to 
criticise the US on human rights and environment 
issues is a marker of how far Washington’s reputation 
has fallen. US policy in the Middle East, particularly 
on Israel, has few followers, and the repercussions of 
the disastrous interventions in Iraq and Afghanistan 
continue to rattle on. Unless China turns quite 
nasty, the inclination of many in the US to see China 
as a challenger to its unipolar position is unlikely 
to attract much sympathy. The financial chaos of 
2008-9 has undermined Washington’s credibility as 
an economic leader.
Anti-Americanism, though obviously not new 
became exceptionally strong under Bush, and is 
now more culturally based, and more corrosive of 
shared identities. It questions whether the ‘American 
way of life’ is an appropriate model for the rest of 
the world, and whether the US economic model is 
either sustainable or desirable. It looks at health; at a 
seeming US inclination to use force as the first choice 
policy instrument, with its domestic parallel of gun 
culture; at the influence of religion and special interest 
lobbies in US domestic politics; at a US government 
which was openly comfortable with the use of torture 
and was re-elected; and at a federal environmental 
policy until recently in denial about global warming; 
and asks not just whether the US is a questionable 
model, but whether it has become a serious part 
of the problem. While some of this was specific 
to the Bush administration, and is being turned 
around by Obama, some of the deeper issues are 
more structural. The US is much more culturally 
conservative, religious, individualistic, and anti-state 
than most other parts of the West. America’s religion 
and cultural conservatism and anti-statism set it apart 
from most of Europe, where disappointment with 
Obama is already palpable. America’s individualism 
and anti-statism set it apart from Asia, where China 
is anyway disinclined to be a follower. This kind of 
anti-Americanism rests on very real differences, and 
raises the possibility that the idea of ‘the West’ was 
just a passing epiphenomenon of the Cold War. The 
Bush administration asset-stripped half-a-century 
of respect for, goodwill towards and trust in US 
leadership, and it reflected, and helped to consolidate, 
a shift in the centre of gravity of US politics. The 
Obama administration cannot just go back to the 
late 1990s and pick up from where Clinton left off. 
LOST CAPACITY
In addition to having less common ground with its 
followers the US also has less capacity, both material 
and ideological, to play the role of leader. The rise 
of China, and also India, Brazil and others, means 
that the US now operates in a world in which the 
distribution of power is becoming more diffuse, 
and in which several centres of power are not 
closely linked to it, and some are opposed. In this 
context, the Bush legacy of a crashed economy and 
an enormous debt severely constrain the leadership 
options of the Obama administration. The economic 
crisis of 2008-9 not only hamstrung the US in terms 
of material capability, but also stripped away the 
Washington consensus as the ideological legitimiser 
for US leadership. The collapse of neoliberal ideology 
might yet be seen as an ideational event on the same 
scale as the collapse of communism in 1989.
Since the late 1990s, and very sharply since 2003, 
the US has in many ways become the enemy of 
its own 20th century project and thus of its own 
capacity to lead. Not surprisingly this has deepened 
a longstanding disjuncture between how the US 
perceives itself and how the rest of the world sees 
it. The deeply established tendency of the US to 
see itself as an intrinsic force for good because it 
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stands for a right set of universal values, makes it unable easily, or possibly at all, to address the disjuncture 
between its self-perception and how others see it. Self-righteous unilateralism does not acquire legitimacy 
abroad. To the extent that celebrations of US power as a good in itself (because the US is good) dominate 
American domestic politics, this does not inspire the US to seek grounds for legitimating its position abroad. 
A contributing factor here is the US tendency to demand nearly absolute security for itself. The problem for 
the US of transcending its own self-image is hardly new, but it has become both more difficult and more 
important in managing its position in the more complex world in which the US is neither so clearly on the 
right side of a great struggle, nor so dominant in material terms. It is unclear at this point whether Obama 
will be able to transcend this aspect of American politics, though it is clear that the nature of American 
politics makes it difficult for any president to do so.
THE TURN AGAINST HEGEMONY
The third constraint stems not from any particular characteristic of the US, but from the fact of unipolarity 
itself. Since decolonisation global international society has developed a growing disjuncture between a 
defining principle of legitimacy based on sovereign equality, and a practice that is substantially rooted in 
the hegemony of great powers. The problem is the absence of a consensual principle of hegemony with 
which international society might bridge this gap between its principles and its practices. A concentration 
of power in one actor disrupts the ideas of balance and equilibrium which are the traditional sources and 
conditions for legitimacy in international society. This problem would arise for any unipolar power, but it 
connects back to the more US-specific aspects of the legitimacy deficit. Under the Bush administration, 
the US lost sight of what Adam Watson calls raison de systeme (‘the belief that it pays to make the system 
work’), and this exacerbated the illegitimacy of hegemony in itself. Since the US looks unlikely to abandon 
its attachment to its own hegemony, this problem is not going to go away. 
If hegemony itself is illegitimate, and the US now lacks both the capabilities and attractiveness to overcome 
this, what lies on the near horizon is a world with no global leader. Such a world would still have several 
great powers influential within and beyond their regions: the EU, Russia, China, Japan, the US, possibly 
India and Brazil. It would also have many substantial regional powers such as South Africa, Turkey and Iran. 
Whether one sees a move towards a more polycentric, pluralist, and probably regionalised, world political 
order as desirable or worrying is a matter of choice. In such a world, global hegemony by any one power 
or culture will be unacceptable. Obama may hasten or delay the US exit from leadership. But the waning 
of the Western tide, and the re-emergence of a more multi-centred (in terms of power and wealth) and 
more multicultural (albeit with substantial elements of Westernization) world, mean that hegemonic global 
leadership whether by a single power or the West collectively is no longer going to be acceptable. The 
question is whether such a new world order can find the foundations for collective great power management, 
and whether the US can learn to live in a more pluralist international society where it is no longer the sole 
superpower but merely the first among equals.
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